FID is essentially apolitical activity. Every act, from military activities to a casual “off-duty” conversation has a political impact.

All operations and activities in a FID environment will have significant psychological effects. Some operations and activities may be conducted specifically to produce a desired psychological effect. A tactical victory may be totally negated or overshadowed by negative psychological effects. Recognizing that perceptions may be more important than reality in this arena, SF must ensure all audiences understand SF operations. Loss of control of perceptions may cause distortion of the facts and may diminish and/or destroy the gains of even the best planned and executed operations.

To win, the insurgency must have a program that explains what is wrong with society and justifies its insurgent actions. It must promise great improvements after the government is overthrown. The insurgency uses ideology to offer society a goal.

The role the U.S. military play in the overall effort of the U.S. government to help a nation free or protect its society from an existing or potential insurgent threat is referred to as FID. U.S. FID operations work on the principle that it is the inherent responsibility of the threatened government to use its leadership and organizational and materiel resources to take the political, economic, and social actions necessary to defeat subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.

U.S. military support to FID should focus on assisting Host Nations in anticipating, precluding, and countering threats or potential threats.

An insurgency relies on secrecy and surprise to conceal itself and to overcome the HN government’s superiority in military power and other resources.

To defeat an insurgency, the HN government must retain or regain the confidence and support of its people. The objective of an IDAD program is not to kill or even capture the insurgents. It is to convince them to abandon a hopeless or worthless cause and support the HN government.

Clandestine insurgent activity may be extensive in urban areas. When military forces reinforce police in an urban area, they must closely control and coordinate their operations to minimize collateral damage and prevent hostile propaganda victories that occur when U.S. or HN military forces overreact to insurgent actions. As a result, the need for PSYOP and Civil Affairs support greatly increases in urban areas.

In Unconventional Warfare, U.S. forces foster and/or support insurgencies against an established government. These operations are characterized by their low visibility, covert, and clandestine nature.

In COIN operations (counter insurgency), command and staff action emphasizes detailed coordination and direction of the intelligence collection effort. These actions take place by:

• Coordinating with HN and U.S. intelligence agencies and HN regular and paramilitary forces.
• Using combat forces and EW intelligence elements to include radar and remotely monitored sensors and other technical surveillance systems.
• Using local people in the development of intelligence collection systems.
• Systematically and thoroughly interrogating prisoners and suspects.

Tactical COIN operations reduce the insurgent threat or activity in the area and provide a favourable environment for the HN’s IDAD program.

Civil-Military Operations - focus on the indigenous infrastructures and population in the operational area. Successful CMO will support the development of favourable attitudes, feelings, or behaviour among the populace toward the HN’s IDAD projects.

Populace and Resources Control

In most instances, the general desire of most of the public is to be left alone to earn a livelihood and to conduct its normal affairs. An effective PSYOP program can exploit this desire for normalcy and direct popular feeling against the insurgents. If the insurgents win popular support among the majority of the populace, the HN government’s military successes are irrelevant.

PSYOP are essential to the success of PRC. For maximum effectiveness, a strong psychological operations effort is directed toward the families of the insurgents and their popular support base. The PSYOP aspect of the PRC program tries to make the imposition of control more palatable to the people by relating the necessity of controls to their safety and well-being.

PSYOP efforts also try to create a favourable national or local government image and counter the effects of the insurgent propaganda effort. The government informs the population that the PRC measures may cause an inconvenience but are necessary due to the actions of the insurgents.

Rights on the legality of detention or imprisonment of personnel (for example, habeas corpus) may be temporarily suspended. PRC measures can also include curfews or blackouts. Checkpoints, searches, roadblocks; surveillance, censorship, and press control; and restriction of activity that applies to selected groups (labour unions, political groups and the like) are further PRC measures.

In countries where government authorities do not have wide latitude in controlling the population, special or emergency legislation must be enacted. This emergency legislation may include a form of martial law permitting government forces to search without warrant, to detain without bringing formal charges, and to execute other similar actions.

PSYOP can support the mission by discrediting the insurgent forces to neutral groups, creating dissension among the insurgents themselves, and supporting defector programs. Divisive programs create dissension, disorganization, low morale, subversion, and defection within the insurgent forces.

The Intelligence Cycle

Security forces can induce individuals among the general populace to become informants.

Security forces use various motives (civic-mindedness, patriotism, fear, punishment avoidance, gratitude, revenge or jealousy, financial rewards) as persuasive arguments.

Surveillance, the covert observation of persons and places, is a principal method of gaining and confirming intelligence information. The basic procedures include mechanical observation (wiretaps or concealed microphones), observation from fixed locations, and physical surveillance of subjects. Whenever a suspect is apprehended during an operation, a hasty interrogation takes place to gain immediate information that could be of tactical value.

If propaganda is a major part of the insurgent effort in the area, a current propaganda and PSYOP file should contain all the pertinent literature, background material, propaganda speeches, and analyses of local grievances the insurgents are exploiting. A local personality and organization file is maintained on each insurgent personality.

Alternative intelligence-gathering techniques and sources, such as doppelganger or pseudo operations, can be tried and used when it is hard to obtain information from the civilian populace. These pseudo units are usually made up of ex-guerrilla and/or security force personnel posing as insurgents.

Before such a unit can be properly trained and disguised, however, much information about the appearance, mannerisms, and security procedures of enemy units must be gathered. Most of this information comes from defectors or reindoctrinated prisoners.